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Abstract 
Existing empirical research findings generally suggest that working capital 
management (WCM) affects and the firms’ financial performance. This paper adopts 
contingency theory framework to investigate how the relationship between WCM and 
financial performance is affected by the firms’ environment, resources and 
management capability. Our sample consist of an unbalanced panel of 802 firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 2004 to 2014 on which a dynamic 
panel data analysis was performed using a series of interactive models to estimate 
the relationship. The findings suggest that the impact of WCM on financial 
performance changes to reflect number contingency variables such as 
environmental, resources and management capabilities of the firm. These findings 
are significant because they demonstrate for the first time how the firms’ ability to 
enhance performance through investment in working capital is influenced by 
contingent factors such as environmental, resource and management capabilities of 
the firm. Our results are also important as they show that contingency theory helps to 
provide an understanding on the conditions under which investment in working 
capital can be an effective tool in enhancing financial performance and the relevant 
contingencies.  
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1. Introduction 
Existing literature has made several theoretical and empirical contributions on 
the relationship between working capital management (WCM) and financial 
performance (Aktas, Croci, and Petmezas 2015; Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel, 
and Martínez-Solano 2010; Deloof 2003; de Almeida and Eid 2014). Evidence from 
these studies supports the traditional belief that WCM affects firm’s financial 
performance, risk and consequently its value (Aktas et al., 2015). Despite the 
strengths of these theoretical and empirical arguments, a number of empirical 
studies indicate that firms policies change over time as they adjust to the demands of 
their environment (Rueda-Manzanares, Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2008; 
Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier, 2009; Otley, 2016), their resource (Mol and 
Wijnberg, 2011) and management capabilities (Luo, Kanuri and Andrews, 2014) with 
the view influencing their financial performance. For example, according to the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model, the degree of concentration in the 
industry determines firm behaviour and performance. This is because higher 
concentration enables collusion between firms which leads to higher profits. It has 
also been suggested that industrial characteristics such as industry concentration 
often results in barriers to entry for new firms and enable established firms to share 
industry profits among themselves (Porter, 1980). 
This study extends existing studies by investigating how the impact of WCM 
on financial performance is likely to change to reflect a number of contingent factors 
such as environment, resources and management capability of the firm as 
postulated by contingency theory. This extension is essential for three reasons. First, 
recent studies (Bastos and Pindado, 2013; Enqvist, Graham and Nikkinen, 2014) 
have shown that firms cash and liquidity management change to reflect external 
environmental conditions. According to Otley (2016), firms tend to adopt more formal 
control and traditional management control systems to enhance their performance 
during a period of adverse external environmental conditions than favorable 
conditions. According to Kestens et al. (2012), during a period economic meltdown, 
firms that use suppliers credit are in better position to keep their operational activities 
stable and are less likely to experience liquidity constraints. On the other hand, firms 
that reach a helping hand to their customers by increasing trade credit offered are 
more likely to achieve additional sales (Nadiri, 1969; Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel 
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and Martínez-Solano, 2010). Building on prior evidence, we determine how external 
environment impacts on working capital performance relationship. Specifically, 
positive increase in investment in working capital is likely to act as insurance during 
times of economic downturns. Therefore, firms are less likely to be affected by the 
adverse effect of holding a substantial level of working capital investment during 
economic downturns relative to economic booms. 
Second, evidence from the resource-based view theory of the firm, suggests 
that resource heterogeneity produces performance differentials among competing 
firms (Peteraf, 1993; Hoopes and Madsen, 2008). Several studies have highlighted 
that working capital investment varies depending on the size of firms due to their 
resource heterogeneity (Peel, Wilson and Howorth, 2000; Howorth and Westhead, 
2003). Peel et al. (2000) assert that smaller firms invest in working capital than large 
firms. This can be explained by the fact that large firms have regular working capital 
management routines and they show a higher prevalence of ad hoc or subjective 
working capital decision-making (Nayak and Greenfield, 1994; Khoury, Smith, and 
MacKay 1999). Against this backdrop, we can expect that the positive (negative) 
impact of holding a low (high) level of working capital investment on firm value is 
more (less) pronounced among smaller firms relative to large firms. 
Third, it has also been suggested that a firm’s financial performance depends 
on its conduct in matters such as its management policy (Spanos, Zaralis and 
Lioukas, 2004). One of such management policies discussed over the years has 
been on the firms’ corporate governance polices (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Forbes 
and Milliken, 2008; Zona, Zattoni and Minichilli, 2013). Several studies have argued 
that strong corporate governance is necessary to create and maintain sound working 
capital management policies for the firm to enhance the value of shareholders 
(Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007; Gill and Biger, 2013). Strong corporate governance is 
a system by which companies are directed and controlled that facilitates an effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of a 
company. For instance,  Gill and Biger, (2013) show that strong corporate 
governance plays an important role in improving the efficiency of working capital 
management. According to the authors, firms with strong corporate governance 
structures can efficiently manage of working capital better. Therefore, strong 
corporate governance, we argue, is necessary to create and maintain sound working 
capital management policies to enhance firms’ financial performance.  
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To test these distinct channels of influence, we adopt a dynamic panel data analysis 
using general methods of moments (GMM) on a sample of an unbalanced panel of 
802 firms listed on the LSE from 2004 to 2014. Evidence of our study offers support 
to these relational pathways for the effects of WCM on firm financial performance. 
We find that the impact of working capital management on financial performance 
changes to reflect number contingency variables such as environmental, resource 
and management capabilities of the firm. 
Our main contribution is by demonstrating, for the first time, how the impact of 
WCM on firms’ financial performance changes under different conditions. While prior 
studies have provided extensive empirical evidence on the impact of WCM on firms’ 
financial performance, there is still no evidence to demonstrate how the firms’ ability 
to enhance performance through investment in working capital is influenced by 
contingent factors such as environmental, resource and management capabilities of 
the firm. We argue that WCM - performance relationship needs to be understood in 
the context these firm-specific characteristics. That is, the contingency framework 
helps to provide an understanding on the conditions under which investment in 
working capital can be an effective tool in enhancing firms’ financial performance and 
which contingencies enhance or constrain firms’ ability to achieve this objective.  
We also contribute to the limited research evidence on the direct relationship 
between WCM and financial performance in the UK where current knowledge and 
understanding is limited given that late payment problems have been identified as a 
source of business failure. The few existing studies that exist (e.g., Howorth and 
Westhead 2003; Tauringana and Afrifa 2013) are based on a sample of small firms. 
Our results based on large listed firms may be different to those based on small firms 
given that Wilson (2008) suggests that large firms tend to use their market power to 
exploit their ‘dominant' positions as buyers in competitive supply markets by taking 
‘extended' trade credit and thus leveraging their profit and cash-flow.   
  The rest of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 is the literature review 
including hypotheses development. In section 3, we discuss the data and describe 
the empirical method used to analyse the data. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 is the summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses development  
2.1 Theoretical framework  
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This study adopts contingency theory to explain why environment, resources 
and management variables may moderate the relationship between WCM and 
financial performance. The theory offers a cogent explanation on the 
interrelationships among organisational sub-systems as well as between the 
organisational system and its environment (Fridman and Ostman, 1989). The 
framework is built on the idea that there is no universally appropriate performance 
management system that applies equally to all organisations in all conditions, but 
particular features of the system and its effectiveness depend on specific 
organisational and context factors (Otley, 1980; Ferreira and Otley, 2005; Wadongo 
and Abdel-Kader, 2014). Therefore, organisations have to adapt their systems and 
structures to be congruent with the various contingencies or circumstances of their 
external environment to be effective (Otley, 2016). 
  Further, contingency theory postulates that the effectiveness of the 
organisation in coping with the demands of its environment is contingent upon the 
different elements of its various sub-systems being designed by the requirements of 
the environment with which they interact (Burrell, 1979). The contingency approach 
holds that organisations will be more effective when a match is achieved between 
the organisation’s contextual factors or contingencies (environment, resources and 
management) and its corporate strategy and organisational structure (Luthans and 
Stewart, 1977). Therefore, an organisation performance depends on the extent to 
which the policy that it seeks to pursue is aligned with its organisational design. This 
alignment between strategy and performance is described as "fit" in the strategic 
management literature (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990) The fit is interpreted as an 
interaction effect of organisational structure and context on performance (Van de 
Ven and Ferry, 1980). When a firm’s structural variable fits at a level that is equal to 
its organisational contingencies, profitability is enhanced and vice versa (Donaldson, 
2001). The better the fit, the more efficient the organisation becomes  (Drazin and 
Ven, 2013). To date, research studies results in other areas are consistent with 
contingency theory (e.g., Forbes and Milliken 1999; Thorgren, Wincent, and Anokhin 
2010; Zona, Zattoni, and Minichilli 2013).  
 
 
2.2 Environmental Conditions, WCM and Financial Performance 
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Environmental Conditions (EC) are conditions that affect the organisation but 
are beyond the direct or positive control of the organisation's resource managers 
(Churchman, 1968). They are usually considered as "givens" or independent 
variables in the contingency framework since they are not subject to the direct 
control of management. Wadongo and Abdel-Kader (2013) observed that EC (i.e. 
environmental unpredictability, turbulence and competition) as one of the most 
significant contingent variable faced by the organisation. According to Chenhall 
(2007, p. 173), “[t]he more hostile and turbulent the external environment, the greater 
the reliance on formal controls and emphasis on traditional budgets”. Otley (1978) 
similarly suggests that tight budget control should be used when faced with severe 
conditions. 
Prior studies (Bastos and Pindado 2013; Enqvist, Graham, and Nikkinen, 
2014 Kestens et al. 2012) demonstrate that firms’ cash and liquidity management 
change to reflect external environmental conditions. For instance, Enqvist, Graham, 
and Nikkinen (2014) assert that the impact of the business cycle on the working 
capital–profitability relationship is more pronounced in economic downturns relative 
to economic booms. According to Kestens et al. (2012), during a period financial 
meltdown, firms that use suppliers credit are in better position to keep their 
operational activities stable and are less likely to experience liquidity constraints. On 
the other hand, firms that reach a helping hand to their customers by increasing their 
trade credit offered are more likely to achieve additional sales (Nadiri, 1969; Baños-
Caballero, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010). 
 Love et al. (2007) finds that financially vulnerable firms adopt an aggressive 
trade credit policy by reducing their investment in trade credit during periods of 
crises. The authors attribute this to the fact that during a period of economic 
meltdown, alternative sources of financing become scarce as stock markets crash 
and foreign lenders pull out their money. That is, as all the potential sources of funds 
dry up, there may be nothing left to redistribute in the form working capital. While 
firms may demand more of suppliers’ credit, suppliers may not be willing to grant 
such request due to contraction of access to external finance. Ramiah et al. (2016), 
explains that during crises periods, firms focus more on the preservation of cash and 
reduction of their cash conversion cycles to secure additional funding buffers for their 
operational activities. Therefore, by adopting an aggressive WCM policy, firms can 
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free up all the excess cash tied up in working capital for profitable investment 
opportunities. 
Several studies focus their analyses on differences in working capital 
management across industries (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999; Filbeck and Krueger, 
2005). According to Porter (1980), the differences in the performance level of 
companies within an industry also depends on the bargaining power between the 
supplier and customer. In an industry with few suppliers but many customers, 
suppliers may enjoy an enhanced financial performance by dictating to customers; 
such as determining the price of the products and even the terms of credit to be 
offered. Nonetheless, fast-growing firms or those operating in competitive markets 
are more likely to adopt a less formalised and conservative WCM policy to enhance 
their market share. These firms offer additional credit to extend their market share, 
and in return, they demand more credit from their suppliers to create equilibrium in 
their cash conversion cycle (Paul and Boden 2008). By investing in working capital, 
firms can make higher performance through enhanced operational efficiencies and 
also increase sales. Building on prior evidence, we determine, for the first time, how 
EC impacts on WCM- financial performance relationship. Specifically, we propose 
that an increase in the severity of EC positively affect how much investment in 
working capital firms need to make in order to enhance their financial performance. 
We, therefore, hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1: Environmental conditions positively moderate the positive relationship  
                      between WCM and financial performance 
 
2.3 Resource Capability, Working Capital Management and Firms Performance  
Another essential contingent factor discussed over recent years is resource 
capability position of organisations. Evidence rooted in the resource-based 
perspective of the firm has uncovered that the development, deployment and 
utilisation of resources and capabilities of firms is more likely to determine a firm's 
ability to enhance their performance (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Headd, 2003). 
The review indicates that resource heterogeneity produces performance differentials 
among competing firms (Peteraf, 1993; Hoopes and Madsen, 2008). According to 
Headd (2003), firms well-endowed with abundant and quality financial resources and 
human capital are less likely to fail compared to those with fewer resources.  
8 
 
One important contingent resource variable which has received limited 
evidence in management accounting literature is size. Chenhall (2007, p. 183) finds 
that only a few studies explicitly use size as a contingency variable (see, for 
example,  Bruns and Waterhouse 1975; Merchant 1981; Ezzamel 1990). Donaldson 
(2001) contend that the size of an organisation is positively associated with a higher 
degree of formalisation. Merchant (1984) argues that as the number of people in any 
organisation increases, it becomes less practical to use informal methods of 
communication and control.   
Howorth and Westhead (2003), assert that small firms need to control and 
monitor their working capital mainly. This is because they are associated with a 
higher proportion of current assets relative to large firms, less liquidity, volatile cash 
flows, and a reliance on short-term debt (Peel et al. 2000). Evidence suggests that 
due to resource constraints, relatively few small firms utilise basic working capital 
management routines and they show a higher prevalence of ad hoc or subjective 
working capital decision-making (Nayak and Greenfield, 1994). 
According to Peel and Wilson (1996), smaller firms adopt formal working 
capital management routines to reduce the probability of business closure, as well as 
to enhance business performance since they have very limited resource capability. A 
firm’s working capital management routines require a formalised method of planning 
and control. In line with this suggestion, we argue that resource constraint firms that 
adopt formal controls WCM routines such as reducing investment in working capital 
can free up excess cash for profitable investment therefore preventing the need for 
expensive external finance (Autukaite and Molay, 2011). The delaying of payments 
to suppliers as a result of indulging in an aggressive strategy of WCM can also 
improve firm performance. Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Resource capability positively moderates the positive relationship  
                      between WCM and financial performance 
 
2.4 Management Capability, WCM and Financial Performance  
Organisational leadership has been one of the generic contingent variables 
examined over the years. According to Battilana et al. (2010) effective organisational 
leadership is essential in addressing performance challenges of an organisation. 
One of such management policies discussed over the years has been on the firms' 
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corporate governance policies (see Zonal et al. 2013). Several studies (Dunn, 2004; 
Combs et al., 2007) suggest that CEOs whose power remains unchecked by outside 
directors’ CEO might be risk averse, less willing to take on new business ventures 
and are more likely to take self-serving actions that decrease shareholder wealth. 
According to the power circulation theory, low CEO's power enhances sufficient 
monitoring by other executives to protect shareholders interest (see Combs et al., 
2007). On the other hand, powerful CEOs may have a positive effect on performance 
due to their ability to control and influence key boards’ decisions despite the potential 
discontentment from other executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Adams, Almeida 
and Ferreira (2005) report a positive association with the CEOs’ power and the 
variance in stock returns, and also Wu et al. (2011) find a positive relationship 
between the CEOs’ power and the variability in the firms’ financial performance. 
  Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) describe that with dual-responsibility, CEOs who 
double as board chairs can serve the interests of the management team better due 
to the lack of undue influence of bureaucratic structures. According to Dahya and 
Travlos (2000) one way to protect the team's position is to hold excessive corporate 
liquidity, which negatively affects the firms' net working capital and also firms 
performance (Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2012; Aktas, 
Croci and Petmezas, 2015). Therefore, strong corporate governance, we argue, is 
necessary to create and maintain sound working capital management policies to 
enhance firms' financial performance. According to Gill and Biger (2013) firms with 
strong corporate governance structures can efficiently manage of working capital 
better and is likely to enhance firms’ financial performance. Accordingly, we 
hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: management capability positively moderates the positive relationship  
  between WCM and financial performance 
 
3. Data and empirical method description 
3.1 Data: sample selection, sources, and description 
The population for the study consists of a sample of 802 firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange listed firms for the period 2004 to 2014. To arrive at our 
final sample, we excluded financial firms such as banks and insurance because they 
have different accounting requirements (e.g. Zalata et.al. 2018; Hill et al., 2010). The 
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criteria were necessary to allow for easy comparability with similar studies and also 
to permit the use of unbalanced panel data, which has the advantage, as argued by 
Gujarati (2003), of more degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity among 
variables. By allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel 
partially mitigates potential selection and survivor bias. The final sample extracted 
from three data sources (Thompson one Analytics, Boardex and Fame accounting 
data stream.), was narrowed down from 1316 listed firms to an unbalanced panel of 
802 firms, representing 6,424 firm-year observations.  
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable 
The study adopts two main dependent variables to measure financial 
performance: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q ratio (QRATIO). Consistent with 
prior literature (e.g., Tauringana and Afrifa 2013), ROA is measured as the ratio of 
net income for the year scaled by total assets. It captures how firms’ internal 
utilisation of resources could be translated into internal performance. However, since 
these firms are listed firms, we adopt QRATIO to determine how effective utilisation 
of the firm resources could be used to create value to shareholders. Moreover, Afrifa 
and Tingbani (2018) argues that market based performance measure is best suited 
for listed firms because it affects investments and financing choices of firms 
(Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi 2013; Ek and  Guerin 2011). 
 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
The study has two sets of independent variables. The first variable of interest 
is WCM, which measures the firm’s investment in working capital. Consistent with 
other studies (Aktas et al. 2015; Hill et al. 2012) we define WCM as the Net 
operating working capital (inventories plus receivables minus accounts payable) 
scaled by sales. The second set of variables includes the set of contingent variables. 
These variables moderate the relationship between WCM and firms performance. 
These contingencies are classified into three components by Luthan and Steward 
(1977): Environmental, Resources and Management variables of the firm. 
Environmental variables (E) include factors that affect the organization, but are 
beyond the direct or positive control of the organization's resource managers 
Churchman (1968). According to, Chenhall (2007, p. 173), “[t]he more hostile and 
turbulent the external environment, the greater the reliance on formal controls”. 
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Following prior studies of Wadongo and Abdel-Kader (2013), we adopt financial 
market turbulence and competitive intensity as the main measures of environmental 
condition. Financial market turbulence is proxy by the recent financial crisis, which 
assumes the value of 1 for the crisis period (2007-2009) and 0 other wise. We 
measured competitive intensity as the degree of competition in an industry using 
Herfindahl index. Following (Afrifa and Gyapong, 2017), we defined the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index as the sum of the squares of the sales market shares of all the 
firms in an industry. 
Resource variables (R) include those tangible and intangible factors over 
which management has more direct control and on which it operates to produce 
desired changes in the organizational system or its environmental supra-system 
(Churchman, 1968). Following prior studies in contingency research (Chenhall 2007, 
Donaldson 2001; Otley 2016); we adopt size, which is measured by the total number 
of employees, as a proxy for the firm’s resource variable. 
Management variables (M) include those concepts and techniques expressed 
in policies, practices and procedures used by the manager to operate on available 
resource variables in defining and accomplishing system objectives (Luthans and 
Stewart, 1977). In order to measure management capability, we construct a measure 
for CEO ability. Following Mollah and Liljeblom (2016), we construct an index based 
on six dummy variables (i.e. it is a sum of six binary variables). The variables 
measure (a) if there is a CEO-Chair duality, (b) if the CEO is internally recruited, (c) if 
the age of the CEO is greater than median age, (d) if the CEO’s tenure is greater 
than median tenure, (e) if the CEO’s banking experience is greater than the median 
banking experience, and (f) if the CEO’s qualifications surpass the median 
qualifications. If a condition exists, the dummy equals one, and zero otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.1.3 Control Variables  
We include other variables to control for other changes in financial 
characteristics. These control variables include: financial leverage (FLEV), which is 
defined as the total debt as a percentage of total assets (Aktas et al., 2015); firm age 
(AGE), which is defined as the number of years between incorporation and the 
calendar year end of each firm (Afrifa and Tingbani, 2018); tangible fixed assets 
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(TAN), which is defined as the fixed assets as a percentage of total assets (Afrifa et. 
al., 2015); sales growth (GROWTH), which is defined as the annual sales growth 
(Sales – Salest−1)/Salest−1 (Baños-Caballero, et al., 2014) and Current ratio  (CR), 
measured as current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial 
year (Tauringana and Afrifa, 2013). 
 
3.2 Regression Model and Specification 
3.2.1 Econometric estimation 
The following dynamic panel models using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991) are used to estimate the 
relationship between working capital, its contingencies and financial performance. 
The estimation approach used is Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) ‘system GMM’. The system GMM estimator has the advantage of controlling 
for endogeneity of the individual explanatory variables, control for the non-
observable constant heterogeneity arising out of the specific features of each firm 
that remain over time and above all improve the efficiency of econometric estimates 
as it allows the introduction of more instruments.  
We control for firm-specific, time-invariant effects, and for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors, by using a first-difference GMM approach. Lags of 
each of the regressors (including the interaction terms) are used as instruments. 
Both time dummies and industry dummies interacted with time dummies and 
included in all our regressions. The validity of GMM estimates depends on the 
absence of second-order serial autocorrelation in the residuals and on the validity of 
the instruments analysed: note that first-order serial correlations are significant by 
way of construction. For this reason, we report both the first- (AR1) and the second-
order (AR2) test for serial correlation, which are asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal under the null of no serial correlation of the differenced residuals. In 
addition, we also report the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions that confirms 
the validity of the selected instruments. All these conditions were met in all our 
estimations.  
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (1)                                                                                                                                                          
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡  + 𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (2)                                                                              
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𝛾𝑖,𝑡 is firm performance measured by: ROA and QRATIO; Xi,t is a matrix of the main 
independent variable of interest working capital management (WCMi,t).  Z is a vector 
representing the control variables (financial leverage (FLEVi,t), firm age (AGEi,t), 
tangible fixed assets (TANi,t), and sales growth (GROWTHi,t)). K represents the 
interactive term between working capital management and Environmental variables 
(WCM x E); working capital management and Resource variable (WCM x R); 
working capital management and Management variables (WCM x M). The  Vi is the 
unobserved firm effects (fixed effects), the parameter  𝜆𝑡  is the time dummy variable;  εit the idiosyncratic shocks. 𝜷𝟏   and 𝜷𝟐 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables are 
presented in Table 2.  From the table, firms make an annual average return on 
assets and QRATIO of 5 per cent and 1.492 respectively.  
The average mean and median of CCC is 65.901 days and 72.446 days 
respectively, which suggests that on average most listed firms are slow in converting 
their inventory into sales and paying their suppliers but fast in receiving payments 
from their customers. The evidence confirms Wilson’s (2008) findings of late 
payment problem among UK firms with large firms being the worse culprits due to 
their long bureaucratic procedures for processing invoices. According to Wilson 
(2008), larger firms take an average of over 74 days to settle their invoices whiles 
small and medium firms take over 58 day. The average GROWTH is 12.696 per cent 
with a median of 12.479 per cent. FLEV has a mean 11.398 per cent and median of 
5.710 per cent. The mean and median CR is 1.590 and 1.280 respectively.  For 
ATAN, the mean is 37.179 per cent with a median of 26.204 per cent. Finally, the 
results show an average age and a mean of mean of 19.842 years and 15.71 years 
respectively. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all the continuous variables 
included to test the association between WCM and firms’ financial performance. The 
evidence presented in the table indicates significant correlations among the various 
continuous variables. The variables (ROA and QRATIO) show a significantly 
negative correlation with WCM.  Variables ROA and QRATIO show significantly 
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positive correlations with AGE, CR and GROWTH, while negatively correlated with, 
ATAN and FLEV. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The baseline specification and method 
Table 4 presents the baseline estimation on the relationship between WCM 
and financial performance of the firms in our panel and their characteristics. Column 
1 and 2 in Table 4 ignore the influence of the controls, while the remaining columns 
(3 and 4) include the control variables. Consistent with our expectations, both 
columns confirm a significant negative relationship between firms’ financial 
performance (ROA and QRATIO) and WCM. The relationship is significant at 1 per 
cent in all the columns.  
The relationship between WCM and financial performance is also significant 
once the control variables have been included in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4. Our 
evidence suggests that reducing investment in WCM can help boost the 
performance of firms. High level of WMC often generates higher opportunity and 
financing costs (Kieschnick et al., 2013) which could seriously constrain the firms’ 
ability to pursue an optimal investment policy so as to enhance their financial 
performance. Therefore, by reducing investment in WCM, firms are able to free the 
excess cash tied up in working capital for value enhancing investment projects in the 
short run (Aktas et al. 2015). These results support the findings by prior studies 
(Aktas et al., 2015; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007 and Autukaite and 
Molay, 2011) that reducing the requirement in working capital leads to less need for 
external financing and less cost of capital, which increases performance.  
Regarding the control variables, the study finds the coefficient estimates of 
AGE, FLEV, ATAN and GROWTH to be statistically significant at conventional level. 
In particular, we find performance to decrease with AGE, ATAN and FLEV. This is 
consistent prior studies (Aktas et al 2015; Afrifa and Tingbani 2018). Consistent with 
Afrifa and Tingbani (2017), we also found GROWTH to be significant and positive 
association with performance, indicating that higher sales improve firm performance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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4.2 Environmental Conditions, Working Capital Management and Financial 
Performance  
As proposed in model 2, there are interactions that influence the scale of the 
impact of WCM on firms’ financial performance. The most important of these 
discussed in the literature are environmental conditions such as competition and 
financial market turbulence. The central hypothesis is that firms are more likely to 
adopt more formal controls such as reducing investment in working capital to 
enhance their performance when faced with severe EC.  
Table 5 and 6 present empirical evidence on the relationship between WCM, 
EC and firms’ financial performance. Evidence from both regressions (columns 1 and 
3, Tables 5 and 6) show significantly positive relation between competitive intensity 
and firms’ financial performance (ROA and QRATIO). The findings suggest that 
competition intensity has a significantly positive influence on firms’ financial 
performance. This is consistent with  Nickell (1999). We also find a significantly 
negative relationship between financial crisis and firm performance, which suggests 
that financial market turbulence adversely affect the performance of firms. The 
overall evidence from measures of EC suggests that EC significantly impacts on the 
performance of firms. 
However, when we interact the EC variables with WCM in Table 6, we find the 
interactive terms (WCM X COMPETITION and WCM X CRISIS) becomes 
significantly positive confirming H1 that EC positively moderates the relationship 
between WCM and firms’ financial performance. In particular, the evidence suggests 
that relationship between WCM and firm performance is influenced by EC 
(COMPETITION and CRISIS) such as the degree of competition in the industry and 
financial market turbulence. According to our evidence, firm operating within very 
competitive industries are able to perform more (less) if they increase (decrease), 
their investment in WCM compared to operating in less competitive industries. We 
attribute this to the fact that firm operating within very competitive industries need to 
offer very generous credit to their customers as a competitive tool in enhancing sales 
and market share (e.g., Hill et al. 2012). On the other hand, during periods of 
financial market turbulence (eg. financial crisis), firms focus more on the preservation 
of cash and reduction of their cash conversion cycles to secure additional funding 
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buffers for their operational activities. Therefore, by adopting an aggressive WCM 
policy, firms can free up all the excess cash tied up in working capital for profitable 
investment opportunities. The coefficient estimates of WCM, AGE, FLEV, ATAN and 
GROWTH are still statistically significant at conventional level as previously 
determined in Table 4. 
 
 
[Insert Table 5 and 6 about here] 
 
4.3 Resource Capability, Working Capital Management and Financial Performance  
We further explore this analysis by looking at the potential impact of resource 
capability on the relations between WCM and firms’ financial performance. We 
investigate whether WCM may vary based on the resource constraint of firms. Our 
argument is built on the premise that, owing to the scarcity of access to financial 
resources, resource constrained firms are more likely to observe high performance 
when t hey adopt formal controls WCM routines than less constrained firms. Table 7 
presents evidence of the relationship between WCM, R and firm performance.  
Evidence from Table 7 (columns 1 and 2) show significantly positive relation 
between R (SIZE) and firms’ financial performance (ROA and QRATIO).  The 
findings suggest that R has a significantly positive influence on firm performance. 
This is consistent prior studies (e.g., Otley, 2016; Wadongo and Abdel-Kader, 2013) 
that link size of the firms' resource capacity to perform. In line with these studies, our 
study contends that due to their resource capability, large firms perform better than 
small firms.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, show the results of the interaction between WCM 
and R on firm performance. We find the coefficient of the interactive term (WCM X R) 
becomes significantly positive confirming H2 that R (SIZE) positively moderates the 
relationship between WCM and firm performance. Specifically, the findings suggest 
firms' with less resource capacity especially smaller firms, adopt formal controls in 
their WCM routines to enhance their performance than less constrained firms (large 
firms). The evidence supports current contingency studies (Donaldson 2001; 
Howorth and Westhead 2003; Otley 2016) linking size to formalisation. We argue 
that since smaller firms have higher proportion of current assets (working capital) 
relative to large firms, it will be beneficial for them to adopt formal control in their 
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WCM routines to enhance their performance. By adopting formal controls, smaller 
firms will be able to control, monitor and eliminate any unnecessary cash tied up in 
their working capital in order to enhance their performance. Consistent with previous 
Tables (4, 5 and 6), the study finds the coefficient estimates of WCM, AGE, FLEV, 
ATAN and GROWTH to be statistically significant at conventional level.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4 Management Capability, Working Capital Management and Financial 
Performance  
In this section we present results on the relationship between WCM, 
management capability and firms’ financial performance. Results of this relationship 
are presented in Table 8. Here, we argue that strong management framework, is 
necessary to create and maintain sound working capital management policies to 
enhance firms' financial performance.  The finding from Table 8 (columns 1 and 2) 
show significantly positive relation between management capability (CEO 
ENTRENCHMENT) and firms’ financial performance (ROA and QRATIO). Our 
evidence supports Fama and Jensen’ (1983) argument that entrenched CEOs have 
positive influence on the financial performance of their firms due to their ability to 
control and influence key boards’ decisions despite the potential discontentment 
from other executives. This is consistent with empirical work by Adams et al. (2005) 
and Wu et al. (2011).  
However, when we interact the management variable (CEO 
ENTRENCHEMENT) with WCM in Table 8, we find the coefficient estimates of the 
interactive term (WCM X CEO ENTRENCHEMENT) to be significantly positive 
confirming H3 that M positively moderates the relationship between WCM and firm 
financial performance. The evidence supports Gill and Biger's (2013) argument that 
firms with strong corporate governance structures can efficiently manage their 
working capital which we argue is likely to enhance firms’ financial performance. 
Specifically, firms with entrenched (less entrenched) CEOs increase (decrease) their 
investment in working capital to enhance firms’ financial performance. This can be 
explained by the fact that entrenched CEOs, CEOs whose power remains 
unchecked by outside directors CEO are often less willing to take on new business 
ventures, more likely to be risk averse and often take self-serving actions that 
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decrease shareholder wealth as suggested by prior studies (Combs et al. 2005; 
Dunn, 2004). In line with the evidence, firms with entrenched CEOs, by virtue of their 
risk profile (risk averse), are more likely to be associated with a conservative working 
capital policy (high investment in working capital), while low entrenched CEOs 
pursue a more aggressive working capital policy (low investment in working capital)  
to enhance firms’  financial performance. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The coefficient estimates for the rest of the variables WCM, AGE, FLEV, ATAN and 
GROWTH are all statistically significant at conventional level as previously 
determined. 
 
5. Additional Analysis and robustness checks  
5.2 Robustness checks 
We run a series of checks to enhance robustness of our analysis. Our first 
check was to determine whether our analysis may be sensitive to the type of 
structure imposed on the model (a dynamic model for the primary results). To assess 
the implication of the imposed structure of the model on the results, we relax the 
dynamic nature of the model by estimating the relation using a static model. In the 
literature both the corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) and the GMM 
estimators were deigned purposely to handle dynamic panels to correct for Nickel 
bias, especially in panels with short time periods, where the bias is severe. In panels 
with period above 30 years, the bias created by the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and fixed effects is small (Judson and Owen, 1999). In such 
instances, the FE estimator performs well relative to both the GMM and LSDVC. In 
this study, we opted for the LSDVC to correct for the bias created by the lagged 
depended on variable in the dynamic model estimation.  
Due to the possibility of potential endogeneity problem as a result of possible 
reverse causation between WCM and firms’  financial performance, we use a 
second-reduced form equation for WCM as specified in eqn. (5), where the residuals 
for this equation is generated and added into eqn. (3 & 4). This is a standard 
approach to deal with issues of endogeneity when there are no suitable available 
instruments. We assumed that WCM, contingent factors (environment, resource and 
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management) and other firm characteristics are vital factors that influence the level 
of financial performance of firms and therefore specify the reduced-form model. 
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                  (3)                                                                                                                                                          
𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡  + 𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (4)                                                                              
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝛾𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                  (5)                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                 
Where all the variables are the same as defined for eqn. (2 &3). 
The results based on a fixed effect model are reported in Table 9. The findings from 
Table 9, suggest a qualitatively similar results as reported in our primary results 
reported previously using the dynamic model. Our general conclusion based on this 
sensitivity analysis is that the results are robust to the model structure (static or 
dynamic) for both the WCM and firms’ financial performance models. 
In the second sensitivity analysis, test whether our analysis is sensitive to 
alternative measure of working capital. We adopted the cash conversion cycle 
(CCC), which measures the average number of days it takes a firm to recoup the 
amount invested in current assets (Deloof 2003; Afrifa and Tingbani, 2018). The 
results reported in Table 10 are in line with our previous evidence of the relation 
between WCM and financial performance.  
 
 
[Insert Table 9 and 10 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion  
The paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between WCM and 
financial performance using three contingent variables (environment, resource and 
management). Using a sample of 802 listed firms from the LSE for the period 2004-
2014, the study finds support for the hypotheses that the impact of WCM on financial 
performance changes to reflect number contingency variables such as 
environmental, resource and management capabilities of the firm. Our  evidence 
also supports Gill and Biger, (2013) argument that firms with strong corporate 
governance structures can efficiently manage their working capital better, which we 
find  to enhance firms’. Specifically, we find that firms with powerful (Less powerful) 
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CEOs increase (decrease) their investment in working capital to enhance firms’ 
financial performance. 
Our results contribute to existing academic literature by improving our 
understanding of how the impact of WCM on ﬁnancial performance changes under 
different conditions. While prior studies provide extensive empirical evidence on the 
impact of WCM on financial performance, there is no evidence to demonstrate how 
the firms’ ability to enhance financial performance through investment in working 
capital is influenced by contingent factors such as environmental, resource and 
management capabilities of the firm. We suggest that the relationship between WCM 
and firms’ financial performance should be understood in the context these firm-
specific characteristics. That is, the contingency framework helps to provide an 
understanding about the conditions under which investment in working capital can be 
an effective tool in enhancing firms’ financial performance and which contingencies 
enhance or constrain firms’ ability to achieve this objective. 
 The results also contribute to the dearth of research evidence on the 
relationship between WCM and financial performance in the UK. The few existing 
studies (Howorth & Westhead 2003; Afrifa et. al., 2015;Tauringana & Afrifa 2013) 
that have investigated this area have primarily focused on smaller firms. The results 
in respect of large companies may be different to those reported in respect of smaller 
companies given that large firms tend to use their market power to exploit their 
‘dominant' positions as buyers in competitive supply markets by taking ‘extended' 
trade credit and thus leveraging their profit and cash-flow.   
These results should, however, be interpreted in the light of a number of 
limitations. For example, the study sample is limited to non-financial companies 
listed on London stock exchange. As a result, we caution scholars against 
generalisation using the findings of this paper. Further, the study relied on only one 
measure for each of the three key contingent variables (environment, resources and 
management). It is possible that the use of different measures of the three 
contingent variables may yield different results.  
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Table 1: Summary of variables, calculations and definitions 
Variable Acronym Description 
Dependent variable    
Return on assets 
 
ROA Ratio of profit before interest and tax to total assets. 
Tobin’s Q Ratio QRATIO Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. 
Independent variable   
Cash Conversion Cycle CCC 
CCC =  ((Total inventories)/(cost of sales) ∗ 365) + ((Accounts receivable)/sales ∗  365)
− ((Accounts payable)/purchases ∗ 365) 
Investment in working capital WCM 
Net operating working capital (inventories plus receivables minus accounts payable) scaled by 
sales 
 
Control Variables    
 Current ratio  CR current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial 
Annual Sales Growth GROWTH Percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year. 
Company Age AGE Number of years between incorporation and the calendar year end of each firm. 
Tangible Fixed Assets ATAN Fixed assets as a percentage of total assets. 
Financial Leverage FLEV Total debt as a percentage of total assets. 
Cash Flow 
 
CFLOW 
 
Operating income before depreciation and amortisation minus interest expense and income tax 
expense scaled total assets.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
The table provides the sample characteristics based on a sample of 802 UK quoted firms over the period 2005−2014. 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev perc 10 Median perc 90 
 QRATIO(ratio) 6,424 1.4921   1.3089   0.9709   1.2143   2.0178 
 ROA(ratio) 6,424 5.1093 11.0232 1.0298 8.2627 16.7553 
CCCt–1 (days) 6,424 65.901 192.610 14.335 72.446 219.452 
GROWTH (%) 6,424   12.696   2.651   9.595   12.479 16.300 
AGE(years) 6,332 19.7312 17.1512   8.9871 15.6013 52.0187 
ATAN (%) 6,113 37.1788 35.4094   3.0187 26.2038 69.2758 
FLEV (%) 6,008 11.3980 13.6211   0.0000   5.7109 29.6456 
CR(ratio) 6,013 1.590 2.330 0.000 1.280 3.190 
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 Table 3: Correlation Matrix.          
The table provides the Pearson correlation coefficients based on a sample of 802 UK quoted firms over the period 2004-2014. 
All variables are defined in Table 1.***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
Variables  QRATIO ROA WCM CFLOW GROWTH AGE SIZE ATAN LEV  CR 
QRATIO 1           
ROA 0.3708 1          
 0.0000           
WCM −0.0315 –0.1365 1         
 0.0000 0.0000          
CFLOW 0.2201 0.2238 0.0768 1        
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000         
GROWTH 0.1570 0.0381 0.0585 0.1472 1       
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000        
AGE 0.1380 0.1856 0.2064 0.2777 0.1817 1      
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000       
SIZE 0.0583 0.1411 –0.066 –0.028 –0.0708 0.1094 1     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
ATAN  −0.1927 -0.0033 0.0499 0.0645 0.0740 0.2390 0.1802 1    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
FLEV −0.1673 -0.1099 0.0701 –0.114 –0.0536 –0.206 –0.239 –0.2323 1   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
CR 0.129 0.0417 0.157 0.0065 -0.0181 0.0230 -0.073 -0.0118 -0.023  1 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
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Table 4: Working Capital Management  and Firms’ Financial Performance 
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the relationship 
between WCM and firm  financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the period 2004-2014, with 
t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on assets and Tobin’s Q. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of 
over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-
squared. The degrees of freedom are given in parenthesis. Instruments include AGEi,t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; 
GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always 
included as regressors and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
DEPENDENT  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLE ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
     
ROA 0.3950*** 
 
0.3841*** 
 
 
(18.58) 
 
(46.69) 
 QRATIO  
 
0.7750*** 
 
0.9081*** 
  
(20.79) 
 
(64.87) 
WCM  -0.0061*** -1.1020*** -0.0210*** -0.0920*** 
 
(-5.54) (-4.86) (-26.99) (-21.34) 
AGE  
  
-0.0908*** -0.0008*** 
   
(-35.22) (-4.68) 
CR 
  
-0.0072*** -0.1352*** 
   
(-16.07) (-29.49) 
FLEV  
  
-0.0149*** -0.0423*** 
   
(-98.36) (-22.13) 
ATAN  
  
-0.0018*** -0.0088*** 
   
(-9.09) (-6.16) 
GROWTH  
  
0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
   
(4.36) (-9.52) 
  
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
     
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
     
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
     
HANSEN TEST 
(P)   0.303           0.440 0.332 0.246 
     
AR1(p) 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
     
AR2(p) 0.342 0.796 0.185 0.407 
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Table 5: Working Capital Management, Environmental Conditions and Firms’ Financial 
Performance  
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the 
relationship between WCM and firm  financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the 
period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1) under 
the null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically 
under null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. The degrees of freedom are given in 
parenthesis. Instruments include AGEi, t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors 
and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLE ROA ROA QRATIO QRATIO 
     
ROA 0.307*** 0.387*** 
  
 
(13.29) (51.03) 
  QRATIO  
  
0.996*** 0.909*** 
   
(50.01) (61.25) 
WCM  -0.0177* -0.0208*** 0.00648 0.187*** 
 
(-1.83) (-26.54) (0.94) (30.78) 
AGE  -0.223*** -0.0871*** 0.000280 -0.00134*** 
 
(-7.99) (-36.01) (0.89) (-9.09) 
CR  -0.0159*** -0.00738*** -0.0423*** -0.132*** 
 
(-3.76) (-17.12) (-4.46) (-33.25) 
CRISIS 
 
-0.0146*** 
 
-0.0460*** 
  
(-36.17) 
 
(-14.84) 
COMPETITION 0.00494*** 
 
0.00451** 
 
 
(7.18) 
 
(2.50) 
 FLEV  -0.00804 -0.0153*** -0.00608 -0.0421*** 
 
(-1.00) (-105.09) (-0.88) (-27.50) 
ATAN  0.000334 -0.00179*** -0.00960 -0.0168*** 
 
(0.29) (-8.80) (-1.61) (-13.82) 
GROWTH  0.0151*** -0.000934*** 0.00401** -0.000421*** 
 
(7.72) (-66.29) (2.10) (-19.93) 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
     
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
     
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
     
HANSEN TEST 
(P) 0.237 0.339 0.442 0.391 
     
AR1 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 (p) 0.299 0.184 0.624 0.383 
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Table 6: Working Capital Management, Environmental Conditions and Firms’ Financial 
Performance  
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the 
relationship between WCM and firm  financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the 
period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the 
null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under 
null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. The degrees of freedom are given in 
parenthesis. Instruments include AGEi,t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors 
and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLE  ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
ROA 0.326*** 0.386*** 
  
 
(14.00) (317.87) 
  QRATIO  
  
0.995*** 0.950*** 
   
(49.49) (35.78) 
WCM  -0.123*** -0.0300*** -0.129*** -0.157*** 
 
(-4.42) (-37.95) (-2.77) (-19.35) 
AGE  -0.182*** -0.0925*** -0.117** 0.000508* 
 
(-4.99) (-24.71) (-2.06) (1.86) 
CR  -0.0184*** -0.00739*** -0.0586*** -0.124*** 
 
(-3.82) (-13.28) (-4.66) (-26.43) 
COMPETITION  0.0593*** 
 
0.0721*** 
 
 
(6.15) 
 
(3.50) 
 CRISIS 
 
-0.135*** 
 
-0.354*** 
  
(-12.61) 
 
(-3.24) 
WCM    x COMPETITION  0.0474*** 
 
0.059*** 
 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.06) 
 WCMt-1   x Crisis 
 
0.0302*** 
 
0.0819*** 
  
(14.05) 
 
(3.62) 
FLEV  -0.00609 -0.0159*** -0.0203 -0.0539*** 
 
(-0.89) (-61.51) (-1.33) (-14.51) 
ATAN  -0.000586 0.00189*** 0.00817 -0.00287 
 
(-0.52) (5.85) (1.15) (-1.22) 
GROWTH  0.0142*** -0.000959*** 0.00392* 0.000422*** 
 
(5.62) (-64.47) (1.76) (14.83) 
    
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
HANSEN TEST (p)  0.168 0.120 0.161 0.210 
AR1 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 (p) 0.328 0.208 0.504 0.731 
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Table 7: Working Capital Management, Resource Capability and Firms’ Financial 
Performance  
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the 
relationship between WCM and firm  financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the 
period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the 
null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under 
null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. The degrees of freedom are given in 
parenthesis. Instruments include AGEi,t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors 
and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
ROA 0.373*** 
 
0.370*** 
 
 
(22.80) 
 
(14.09) 
 QRATIO  
 
0.989*** 
 
0.992*** 
  
(98.91) 
 
(78.52) 
WCM  -0.0208*** -0.0229*** -0.0294*** -0.0313*** 
 
(-27.44) (-11.20) (-33.42) (-10.04) 
WCM  X SIZE  
  
0.0276*** 0.006*** 
   
(12.12) (0.03) 
AGE  -0.100*** -0.001*** -0.102*** -0.001*** 
 
(-34.07) (-5.51) (-23.69) (-4.08) 
CR  -0.00517*** -0.0765*** -0.007*** -0.0939*** 
 
(-11.56) (-10.46) (-6.97) (-11.49) 
SIZE    0.0395*** 0.0047*** 0.0612*** 0.0716* 
 
(7.68) (6.39) (7.10) ( 1.96) 
FLEV  -0.0141*** -0.0073*** -0.0138*** -0.0123*** 
 
(-81.70) (-6.80) (-47.32) (-5.84) 
ATAN  -0.000711*** -0.0066*** -0.000681** -0.0082*** 
 
(-2.76) (-3.29) (-2.29) (-3.58) 
GROWTH  -0.0009*** 0.0003*** -0.001*** 0.0004*** 
 
(-61.35) (10.71) (-51.56) (10.70) 
     
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
HANSEN TEST 
(p) 0.143 0.213 0.304 0.146 
AR1 (p) 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
AR2 (p) 0.314 0.102 0.379 0.142 
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Table 8: Working Capital Management, management capability and Firm Financial 
Performance  
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the 
relationship between WCM and firm  financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the 
period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the 
null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under 
null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. The degrees of freedom are given in 
parenthesis. Instruments include AGEi,t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors 
and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
ROA 0.373*** 
 
0.370*** 
 
 
(21.90) 
 
(14.90) 
 
     QRATIO 
 
0.989*** 
 
0.992*** 
  
(977.91) 
 
(787.52) 
WCM -0.0208*** -0.0229*** -0.0294*** -0.0313*** 
 
(-27.44) (-11.20) (-33.42) (-10.04) 
WCM x M 
  
0.0276*** 0.064** 
   
(12.12) (0.03) 
AGE  0.0998*** -0.000633*** 0.101*** -0.000507*** 
 
(33.93) (-5.51) (23.49) (-4.08) 
CR -0.00517*** -0.0765*** -0.00661*** -0.0939*** 
 
(-11.56) (-10.46) (-6.97) (-11.49) 
     M 0.0395*** 0.0458* 0.0612*** 0.0717* 
 
(7.68) (1.76) (7.10) (1.96) 
     FLEV  -0.0141*** -0.00729*** -0.0138*** -0.0123*** 
 
(-81.70) (-6.80) (-47.32) (-5.84) 
ATAN  -0.000711*** -0.00655*** -0.000681** -0.00820*** 
 
(-2.76) (-3.29) (-2.29) (-3.58) 
GROWTH  -0.000857*** 0.000306*** -0.000898*** 0.000443*** 
FLEV (-61.35) (10.71) (-51.56) (10.70) 
 
(-15.08) (-9.58) (-11.65) (-6.72) 
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
HANSEN TEST 
(p) 0.386 0.260 0.330   0.438 
AR1 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 (p) 0.966 0.101 0.764 0.28 
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Table 9: Alternative measure of  Working Capital Management on Firms’ Financial Performance  
This table reports a  generalized method of moments (GMM) first-difference estimation on the relationship between working capital management measured by 
the cash conversion cycle (CCC) and firms’ financial performance for across 802 UK quoted firms over the period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in 
parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on assets and Tobin’s Q. All variables are defined in Table 1. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the null of no serial. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions distributed asymptotically under null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. The degrees of freedom are given in parenthesis. 
Instruments include AGEi,t-2; CRi,t-2 FLEVi,t-2; GROWTHi,t-2; and further lags. Year dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always 
included as regressors and as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
ROA ROA QRATIO QRATIO ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
ROA 0.336*** 0.386*** 
  
0.358*** 
 
0.391*** 
 
 
(35.34) (31.87) 
  
(157.83) 
 
(136.15) 
 QRATIO 
  
0.79*** 0.700*** 
 
0.762*** 
 
0.77*** 
   
(30.17) (47.34) 
 
(59.05) 
 
(69.71) 
CCC -0.0279** -0.0300*** -0.00125 -0.0011*** -0.00105*** -0.00032*** -0.00128*** -0.0004*** 
 
(-2.52) (-37.95) (-1.09) (-7.94) (-14.96) (-7.31) (-13.65) (-12.62) 
COMPETITION 0.0136*** 
 
0.0478*** 
     
 
(7.66) 
 
(6.94) 
     CRISIS 
 
-0.135*** 
 
-0.826*** 
    
  
(-12.61) 
 
(-12.11) 
    SIZE 
    
0.182*** 0.0943*** 
  
     
(16.00) (3.10) 
  M 
      
-0.0261* -0.314*** 
       
(-1.95) (-34.80) 
CCC X 
COMPETITION 0.01023** 
 
0.108*** 
     
 
(5.18) 
 
(8.60) 
     CCC X CRISIS  
 
0.0302*** 
 
0.179*** 
    
  
(14.05) 
 
(12.66) 
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CCCX SIZE 
    
0.269*** 0.0678*** 0.0332*** 0.0735*** 
CCC X M 
   
(11.17) (10.04) (34.29) (41.32) 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
HANSEN TEST (p)  0.445 0.433 0.472 0.161 0.21 0.432 0.194 0.412 
AR1 (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 (p) 0.131 0.208 0.702 0.373 0.504 0.731 0.182 0.884 
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Table 10: Working Capital Management on Firms’ Financial Performance  
This table reports a fixed effects estimation on the relationship between working capital management and firms financial performance for across 802 
UK quoted firms over the period 2004-2014, with t−statistics (reported in parentheses). The dependent variable is the return on assets and Tobin’s 
Q. All variables are defined in Table 1.  Year dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and 
as instruments.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels correspondingly (two−tailed tests). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO ROA QRATIO 
 WCM -0.068*** -0.053** -0.23*** -0.0046 -0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0007 -0.0139 
 
(-6.29) (-2.53) (-5.52) (-0.47) (-1.12) (-0.48) (-0.57) (-0.77) 
COMPETITION 2.678*** 0.315** 
  
-0.103*** 
   
 
(11.16) (2.12) 
  
(-3.32) 
   CRISIS 
  
-0.005** -0.234*** 
    
   
(-2.28) (-5.52) 
    CEO ABILITY 
      
-0.086*** -0.0096* 
       
(-3.68) (-1.77) 
SIZE 
    
-4.975*** -0.067** 
  
     
(-3.75) (-2.74) 
  WCM X 
COMPETITION 0.0190*** 0.00204* 
      
 
(4.68) (1.96) 
      WCM X CRISIS 
  
0.0261** 0.0045** 
    
   
(2.34) (2.28) 
    WCM X CEO POWER 
     
0.189*** 0.0207** 
       
(3.04) (2.03) 
WCM X SIZE 
    
0.0228** 0.0220*** 
  
     
(2.13) (4.08) 
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OBSERVATIONS 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 5,845 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FIRM-AND YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-SQUARED 0.3093 0.3565 0.3103 0.3575 0.3074 0.3491 0.3094 0.3501 
